Artikel
BENIGN NEGLECT OF COVENANT VIOLATIONS: BLISSFUL BANKING OR IGNORANT MONITORING?
Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalization. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalized banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands-off approach is associated with improved borrowers' performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks. (JEL G21, G32, G33, G34)
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Journal: Economic Inquiry ; ISSN: 1465-7295 ; Volume: 59 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 459-477 ; Boston, USA: Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Colonnello, Stefano
Koetter, Michael
Stieglitz, Moritz
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- (where)
-
Boston, USA
- (when)
-
2020
- DOI
-
doi:10.1111/ecin.12930
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Colonnello, Stefano
- Koetter, Michael
- Stieglitz, Moritz
- Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Time of origin
- 2020