Arbeitspapier

Migration-regime liberalization and social security : political-economy effect

The pay-as-you-go social security system, which suffers from dwindling labor force, can benefit from immigrants with birth rates that exceed the native-born birth rates in the host country. Thus, a social security system provides effectively an incentive to liberalize migration policy. The paper examines a political- economy, inter-generational, mechanism through which the social security system influences voter attitudes in favor of more liberal immigration regime. We demonstrate that the Markov equilibrium, with social security, consists of more liberal migration policies, than the corresponding Markov equilibrium with no social security.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2653

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Migration
Social Security and Public Pensions
Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Subject
Migrationspolitik
Einwanderungsrecht
Deregulierung
Sozialversicherungsfinanzierung
Umlageverfahren
Einwanderung
Fruchtbarkeit
Public Choice
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Razîn, Assaf
Sand, Edith
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2009

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Razîn, Assaf
  • Sand, Edith
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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