Who benefits from resale-below-cost laws?

Arbeitspapier

We investigate the effect of banning resale-below-cost offers. There are two retailers with heterogeneous bargaining positions in relation to a monopolistic manufacturer. Each retailer sells two goods: one procured from the monopolistic manufacturer and the other, from a competitive fringe. In equilibrium, banning resale-below-cost offers can decrease the retailers' prices. The ban can benefit the weak retailer in terms of bargaining position and increase the total consumer surplus, although it harms the dominant retailer and the monopolistic manufacturer. Contrary to the basic scenario, when the weak retailer is horizontally separated, the ban benefits the monopolistic manufacturer

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 875

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation ; Firm Behavior: Theory
• Thema: Loss-leader Pricing ; Channel Power ; Vertical Relations

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Matsushima, Noriaki ; Miyaoka, Akira
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (wo): Osaka
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92842
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ