Arbeitspapier

Public Goods and Public Bads

In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of a public characteristic in divergent ways: While for one group it represents a public good, it is a public bad for another group. Applying Cornes’ and Hartley’s (2007) Aggregative Game Approach, we analyze a general model, in which such contentious public characteristics are present and are provided cooperatively. In particular, we establish neutrality results w.r.t. redistribution and growth of income, infer the effects of preference changes and coalition building and present a technology paradox. Finally, we compare the outcome of voluntary provision of the contentious public characteristic with the Pareto optimal solution highlighting a potential conflict between equity and efficiency in this case.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6437

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Subject
public goods
public bads
voluntary provision
neutrality

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Cornes, Richard
Rübbelke, Dirk
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Buchholz, Wolfgang
  • Cornes, Richard
  • Rübbelke, Dirk
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2017

Other Objects (12)