Arbeitspapier

Public Goods and Public Bads

In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of a public characteristic in divergent ways: While for one group it represents a public good, it is a public bad for another group. Applying Cornes’ and Hartley’s (2007) Aggregative Game Approach, we analyze a general model, in which such contentious public characteristics are present and are provided cooperatively. In particular, we establish neutrality results w.r.t. redistribution and growth of income, infer the effects of preference changes and coalition building and present a technology paradox. Finally, we compare the outcome of voluntary provision of the contentious public characteristic with the Pareto optimal solution highlighting a potential conflict between equity and efficiency in this case.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6437

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Thema
public goods
public bads
voluntary provision
neutrality

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Cornes, Richard
Rübbelke, Dirk
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Buchholz, Wolfgang
  • Cornes, Richard
  • Rübbelke, Dirk
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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