Arbeitspapier

The Political Economy of Privatization: Why Do Governments Want Reforms?

International organizations promote privatization as precondition for economic development. But is there really too little privatization? This political economy model asks for the incentives of governments to privatize or restructure a state-owned firm. Different government types are compared to identify the political and institutional determinants of privatization. Under privatization, governments commit not to in influence the profit-maximizing employment choice by private investors. With respect to the social optimum, both voter-oriented and egoistic governments can have inefficiently high incentives to privatize. When this is the case, outside pressure to privatize is detrimental. An improving institutional environment reduces these inefficiencies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 106.2004

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Governmental Property
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Thema
Political incentives
Privatization
Restructuring
Employment
Privatisierung
Neue politische Ökonomie
Organisatorischer Wandel
Öffentliches Unternehmen

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boerner, Kira
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boerner, Kira
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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