Arbeitspapier
(Why) Do Central Banks Care About Their Profits?
We document that central banks are significantly more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits. The discontinuity in the profit distribution is (i) more pronounced amid greater political or public pressure, the public’s receptiveness to more extreme political views, and agency frictions arising from governor career concerns, but absent when no such factors are present, and (ii) correlated with more lenient monetary policy inputs and greater inflation. These findings indicate that profitability concerns, while absent from standard theoretical models of central banking, are both present and effective in practice, and inform a theoretical debate about monetary stability and the effectiveness and riskiness of non-traditional central banking.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6546
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Thema
-
central banks
profitability
non-traditional central banking
monetary stability
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Goncharov, Igor
Ioannidou, Vasso
Schmalz, Martin C.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
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2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goncharov, Igor
- Ioannidou, Vasso
- Schmalz, Martin C.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2017