Arbeitspapier

(Why) Do Central Banks Care About Their Profits?

We document that central banks are significantly more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits. The discontinuity in the profit distribution is (i) more pronounced amid greater political or public pressure, the public’s receptiveness to more extreme political views, and agency frictions arising from governor career concerns, but absent when no such factors are present, and (ii) correlated with more lenient monetary policy inputs and greater inflation. These findings indicate that profitability concerns, while absent from standard theoretical models of central banking, are both present and effective in practice, and inform a theoretical debate about monetary stability and the effectiveness and riskiness of non-traditional central banking.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6546

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
Thema
central banks
profitability
non-traditional central banking
monetary stability

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goncharov, Igor
Ioannidou, Vasso
Schmalz, Martin C.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goncharov, Igor
  • Ioannidou, Vasso
  • Schmalz, Martin C.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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