How WTO commitments tame uncertainty

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies how WTO rules and flexibilities shape its members' trade policy responses to import shocks. Guided by a cost benefit analysis model and using a unique database of tariff bindings for all WTO countries over the 1996-2011 period, we show that WTO commitments affect members' trade policy. More stringent bindings reduce the likelihood of responding to import shocks by raising tariffs and increase the likelihood of contingent measures. We argue that this reduces overall trade policy uncertainty. In a counterfactual scenario where WTO members can arbitrarily increase tariffs they are 4.5 times more likely to do so than under current bindings.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WTO Staff Working Paper ; No. ERSD-2019-06

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations ; Empirical Studies of Trade ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
• Subject: trade agreements ; trade policy ; trade policy uncertainty ; anti-dumping

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Jakubik, Adam ; Piermartini, Roberta
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): World Trade Organization (WTO)
• (where): Geneva
• (when): 2019

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.30875/d1a7253c-en
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197322
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET