Arbeitspapier

How WTO commitments tame uncertainty

This paper studies how WTO rules and flexibilities shape its members' trade policy responses to import shocks. Guided by a cost benefit analysis model and using a unique database of tariff bindings for all WTO countries over the 1996-2011 period, we show that WTO commitments affect members' trade policy. More stringent bindings reduce the likelihood of responding to import shocks by raising tariffs and increase the likelihood of contingent measures. We argue that this reduces overall trade policy uncertainty. In a counterfactual scenario where WTO members can arbitrarily increase tariffs they are 4.5 times more likely to do so than under current bindings.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WTO Staff Working Paper ; No. ERSD-2019-06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Empirical Studies of Trade
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
Thema
trade agreements
trade policy
trade policy uncertainty
anti-dumping

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jakubik, Adam
Piermartini, Roberta
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
World Trade Organization (WTO)
(wo)
Geneva
(wann)
2019

DOI
doi:10.30875/d1a7253c-en
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jakubik, Adam
  • Piermartini, Roberta
  • World Trade Organization (WTO)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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