Konferenzbeitrag

Economic Rewards versus Economic Sanctions in International Relations

I use game-theoretical models to compare a sender's expected payoff under two methods of wielding influence under incomplete information: offering rewards or threatening punishments. Attempts to influence another's behaviour can have the perverse effect of actually encouraging the behaviour that one is trying to discourage by creating, albeit different, incentives to bluff. Under a reward regime, targets can bluff in order to extort larger inducements. Under a sanction regime, targets can bluff in order to deter coercion attempts. I find that while sanctions are a weakly dominant tool of influence under complete information, rewards can be preferable under incomplete information. The sender often could do better by committing to a certain course of action for the entire duration of interaction. Moreover, using rewards and sanctions in combination can mitigate their adverse effects on targets' bluffing incentives when deploying only one instrument of influence separately.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Political Economy III ; No. E01-V2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Foreign Aid
International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
Thema
Economic Statecraft
Rewards
Sanctions
International Relations
International Organisations
Incomplete Information
Uncertainty
Game Theory

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Brekhov, Boris
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(wo)
Kiel, Hamburg
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Beteiligte

  • Brekhov, Boris
  • ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Entstanden

  • 2019

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