Arbeitspapier
Do Workers Discriminate against Their Out-group Employers? Evidence from the Gig Economy
We study possible worker-to-employer discrimination manifested via social preferences in an online labor market. Specifically, we ask, do workers exhibit positive social preferences for an out-race employer relative to an otherwise-identical, own-race one? We run a well-powered, model-based experiment wherein we recruit 6,000 workers from Amazon's M-Turk platform for a real-effort task and randomly (and unobtrusively) reveal to them the racial identity of their non-fictitious employer. Strikingly, we find strong evidence of race-based altruism – white workers, even when they do not benefit personally, work relatively harder to generate more income for black employers. Self-declared white Republicans and Independents exhibit significantly more altruism relative to Democrats. Notably, the altruism does not seem to be driven by race-specific beliefs about the income status of the employers. Our results suggest the possibility that pro-social behavior of whites toward blacks, atypical in traditional labor markets, may emerge in the gig economy where associative (dis)taste is naturally muted due to limited social contact.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13012
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Discrimination
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Field Experiments
- Thema
-
discrimination
worker-to-employer
social preferences
taste-based discrimination
Gig Economy
mechanical turk
Structural Behavioral Economics
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Asad, Sher Afghan
Banerjee, Ritwik
Bhattacharya, Joydeep
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Asad, Sher Afghan
- Banerjee, Ritwik
- Bhattacharya, Joydeep
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2020
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