Arbeitspapier
Selling to the Mean
We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer’s valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much information the seller has about the mean. However, when the seller has information about the mean and the variance, or the mean and the upper bound of the support, the seller optimally commits to a randomization over prices and obtains a strictly positive payoff. In such a case additional information about the mean and/or the variance affects his payoff.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5443
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
optimal mechanism design
robustness
incentive compatibility
individual rationality
ambiguity aversion
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kos, Nenad
Messner, Matthias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kos, Nenad
- Messner, Matthias
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2015
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