Arbeitspapier

The Right Person for the Right Job: Workers' Prosociality as a Screening Device

The impact of workers' non-pecuniary motivation on their productivity is a fundamental issue in labor economics. Previous studies indicate that prosocially motivated workers may perform better when assigned to jobs having socially desirable implications – even if effort is non contractible and they are offered a low-powered fixed-compensation scheme – as compared to a standard job with an effort-contingent payment. This suggests that profit maximizing employers should assign workers to different jobs, based on workers' prosociality. We run an experiment to explore the link between workers' prosociality and their level of effort under a prosocial and a standard job, and show that employers actually exploit the information on workers' prosociality to assign them the type of job that would be most profitable from the firm's perspective.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14779

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Thema
dictator game
incentives
laboratory experiment
principal-agent game
real-effort task

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bigoni, Maria
Ploner, Matteo
Vu, Thi-Thanh-Tam
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bigoni, Maria
  • Ploner, Matteo
  • Vu, Thi-Thanh-Tam
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2021

Ähnliche Objekte (12)