Arbeitspapier

Rapacious resource depletion, excessive investment and insecure property rights

For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. The theory suggests that adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2981

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
Sustainable Development
Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
Thema
exhaustible resources
Hotelling rule
Hartwick rule
capital
sustainable consumption
fractionalization
seepage
insecure property rights
differential game
genuine saving
adjusted net saving
Ressourcenökonomik
Rohstoffressourcen
Eigentumsrecht
Soziale Gruppe
Investition
Hotelling-Regel
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
van der Ploeg, Frederick
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • van der Ploeg, Frederick
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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