Arbeitspapier
Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a model where players can reject certain partnerships in cooperation. For normalised indices strategic rejection may increase power. Our notion of a strategic power index is well defined if power is measured by an index that takes only minimal winning coalitions into account.
- ISBN
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978-615-5447-50-1
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2014/31
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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quarrelling
rejected coalitions
a priori voting power
power indices
minimal winning coalitions
rational players
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kóczy, László Á.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
- (where)
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Budapest
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kóczy, László Á.
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
Time of origin
- 2014
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