Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games: Theory and experiment in continuous time

Arbeitspapier

Standard one- and two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a uniparametric family combining intra- and intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter k. For the example of the hawk-dove game, we analyze the replicator dynamics of the coupled model. We confirm the existence of a bifurcation in the dynamics of the system and identify three regions for equilibrium selection, one of which does not appear in common one- and two-population models. We also design a continuous-time experiment, exploring the dynamics and the equilibrium selection. The data largely confirm the theory.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-221-9
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 222

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: evolutionary game theory ; experiment in continuous time ; hawk-dove game ; replicator dynamics

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Benndorf, Volker ; Martinez-Martinez, Ismael ; Normann, Hans-Theo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (where): Düsseldorf
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142181
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET