Arbeitspapier

Payment system settlement and bank incentives

In this paper we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments. Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves but increases moral hazard problems. The "put option" value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. ; Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default. Net settlement becomes more attractive relative to gross settlement if bank assets have to be liquidated at less than book value.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 96-10

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Financial institutions
Financial services industry
Payment systems

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kahn, Charles M.
Roberds, William
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
(where)
Atlanta, GA
(when)
1996

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kahn, Charles M.
  • Roberds, William
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Time of origin

  • 1996

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