Arbeitspapier

Payment system settlement and bank incentives

In this paper we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments. Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves but increases moral hazard problems. The "put option" value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. ; Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default. Net settlement becomes more attractive relative to gross settlement if bank assets have to be liquidated at less than book value.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 96-10

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Financial institutions
Financial services industry
Payment systems

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kahn, Charles M.
Roberds, William
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
(wo)
Atlanta, GA
(wann)
1996

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kahn, Charles M.
  • Roberds, William
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Entstanden

  • 1996

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