Konferenzbeitrag
The Political Economy of Bank Bailouts
In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers' money into a bank in distress is 30~percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Bank regulation, bail-out expectations, and systemic risk ; No. B06-V2
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Haselmann, Rainer
Kick, Thomas
Behn, Markus
Vig, Vikrant
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Haselmann, Rainer
- Kick, Thomas
- Behn, Markus
- Vig, Vikrant
Entstanden
- 2015
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