Konferenzbeitrag

Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity

We model asset opacity and deposit rate choices of banks who imperfectly compete for uninsured deposits, are subject to runs, and face a threat of entry. Higher competition increases deposit rates and bank fragility, resulting in an intermediate socially optimal level of bank competition. We provide a novel theory of bank opacity. The cost of opacity is more partial runs by creditors, which induces costly liquidation of investment and lowers current profits. The benefit of opacity is to deter entry of competitors, which increases bank charter value. Banks can be excessively opaque, motivating transparency regulation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Competition
entry
opacity
fragility
bank run
global games
competition policy
transparency regulation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ahnert, Toni
Martinez-Miera, David
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
(wo)
Kiel, Hamburg
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Beteiligte

  • Ahnert, Toni
  • Martinez-Miera, David
  • ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Entstanden

  • 2021

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