Konferenzbeitrag
Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity
We model asset opacity and deposit rate choices of banks who imperfectly compete for uninsured deposits, are subject to runs, and face a threat of entry. Higher competition increases deposit rates and bank fragility, resulting in an intermediate socially optimal level of bank competition. We provide a novel theory of bank opacity. The cost of opacity is more partial runs by creditors, which induces costly liquidation of investment and lowers current profits. The benefit of opacity is to deter entry of competitors, which increases bank charter value. Banks can be excessively opaque, motivating transparency regulation.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
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Competition
entry
opacity
fragility
bank run
global games
competition policy
transparency regulation
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Ahnert, Toni
Martinez-Miera, David
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (wo)
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Kiel, Hamburg
- (wann)
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2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Ahnert, Toni
- Martinez-Miera, David
- ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Entstanden
- 2021