Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games

Arbeitspapier

When a strategic situation arises repeatedly, the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process. We examine myopic adjustment dynamics, a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, simple models of imitation, models of experimentation and adjustment, and some simple learning dynamics. We present a series of theorems showing conditions under which behavior that is asymptotically stable under some such dynamic is strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens [1986]). This behavior is thus as if the agents in the economy satisfied the extremely stringent assumptions that game theory traditionally makes about rationality and beliefs.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1001

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: game theory ; evolution ; learning ; adjustment dynamics ; dynamics ; dynamic stability ; strategic stability

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Swinkels, Jeroen M.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 1991

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221358
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET