Arbeitspapier

Establishing a hawkish reputation: Interest rate setting by newly appointed central bank governors

In this paper, we explore the interest rate setting behavior of newly appointed central bank governors. We use the Kuttner and Posen (2010) sample, which covers 15 OECD countries, and estimate an augmented Taylor (1993) rule for the period 1974-2008. We find, first, that newly appointed governors fight inflation more aggressively during the first four to eight quarters of their tenure in an effort to establish a reputation for being inflation averse. Second, we find a significantly stronger reaction to inflation by newly appointed governors working within monetary policy frameworks comprised of an at least partly independent central bank and an explicit nominal anchor.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 46-2012

Classification
Wirtschaft
Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Subject
Central bank governors
credibility
inflation
monetary policy
reputation
Taylor rules

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Neuenkirch, Matthias
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
(where)
Marburg
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Neuenkirch, Matthias
  • Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Time of origin

  • 2012

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