Business Cycles and Police Hires

Arbeitspapier

We show that the quality of police hires varies over the business cycle. Officers hired when the unemployment rate is high have fewer complaints, disciplines, and are less likely to be fired than officers hired when the unemployment rate is low. Effects are larger for younger workers who have weaker outside options in recessions. We find that the size and quality of the applicant pool increases in high unemployment years–more people take entry exams and a smaller fraction fail the exam. Our findings shed light on how outside options affect police hires and speak to policy questions about police recruitment.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 15665

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Public Sector Labor Markets ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Thema: police hiring ; police quality ; public sector labor markets ; outside options

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Saltiel, Fernando ; Tuttle, Cody
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2022

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/267402
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ