Arbeitspapier

Politicians, bankers and the Great Depression: The Spanish banking crisis of 1931

This paper contributes to the literature on moral hazard, lending of last resort and the political origins of banking crises. Drawing on newly accessed quantitative and qualitative archival sources the paper documents how a bank - Banco de Cataluña - formed a coalition with the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-30) in order to depart from the framework of "constructive ambiguity" that characterized central bank lending of last resort in Spain. As a result, the bank developed a uniquely risky portfolio and incurred in insider lending to internationally exposed firms at the onset of the Great Depression. The fall of the Dictatorship and democratic transition, the collapse of international trade, and global deflation during 1929-31 made fragilities emerge causing the bank to fail.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: eabh Papers ; No. 22-01

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: Europe: 1913-
Central Banks and Their Policies
Financial Crises
Thema
moral hazard
lender of last resort
Great Depression

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jorge-Sotelo, Enrique
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jorge-Sotelo, Enrique
  • The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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