Politicians, bankers and the Great Depression: The Spanish banking crisis of 1931

Arbeitspapier

This paper contributes to the literature on moral hazard, lending of last resort and the political origins of banking crises. Drawing on newly accessed quantitative and qualitative archival sources the paper documents how a bank - Banco de Cataluña - formed a coalition with the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-30) in order to depart from the framework of "constructive ambiguity" that characterized central bank lending of last resort in Spain. As a result, the bank developed a uniquely risky portfolio and incurred in insider lending to internationally exposed firms at the onset of the Great Depression. The fall of the Dictatorship and democratic transition, the collapse of international trade, and global deflation during 1929-31 made fragilities emerge causing the bank to fail.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: eabh Papers ; No. 22-01

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: Europe: 1913- ; Central Banks and Their Policies ; Financial Crises
• Thema: moral hazard ; lender of last resort ; Great Depression

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jorge-Sotelo, Enrique
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH)
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2022

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/265141
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ