Arbeitspapier
Towards a political economy of industrial organization: empirical regularities from deregulation
This paper argues that the study of policy incidence in industrial organization needs to take the endogeneity of government into account. The point is made by investigating whether political considerations are important in terms of understanding the causes and effects of deregulation using data provided by the OECD. In particular, we address two interrelated questions: (i) do political and institutional factors matter in a systematic way in terms of the decision to deregulate, and (ii) if so, what does this imply in terms of the policy incidence of deregulation. Our results indicate that political considerations do matter. Most importantly, by introducing political and institutional variables into the empirical analysis of policy incidence, we find that policy conclusions are substantially different from an analysis that treats political factors exogenously. We conclude that the evidence is suggestive of the claim that a full understanding of the effect of government intervention in the marketplace implies a closer integration of political economy with industrial organization.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 01-17
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
- Thema
-
Deregulation
Political Economy
Mobile Telecommunications
Simultaneity Bias
OECD
Deregulierung
Politische Ökonomie
Mobilfunksindustrie
Simultaneität
OECD
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Duso, Tomaso
Röller, Lars-Hendrik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Duso, Tomaso
- Röller, Lars-Hendrik
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2001
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