Arbeitspapier

Voting for compromises: Alternative voting methods in polarized societies

Democratic societies have been increasingly confronted with extreme, knife-edge election outcomes that affect everybody's lives and contribute to social instability. Even if political compromises based on social conventions as equity or economic arguments as efficiency are available, polarized societies might fail to select them. We demonstrate that part of the problem might be purely technical and, hence, potentially solvable. We study different voting methods in three experiments (total N = 5, 820), including small, medium-sized, and large electorates, and find that currently-used methods (Plurality Voting and Rank-Order systems) can lead voters to overwhelmingly support egoistic options. In contrast, alternative, more nuanced methods (Approval Voting and Borda Count) reduce the support for egoistic options and favor equity and efficiency, avoiding extreme outcomes. Those methods differ in whether they favor equity or efficiency when the latter benefits a majority. Our evidence suggests that targeted changes in the electoral system could favor socially-desirable compromises and increase social stability.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 394

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Thema
Polarization
social compromises
equity
efficiency
voting methods

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
Buckenmaier, Johannes
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-206161
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
  • Buckenmaier, Johannes
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2021

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