Building the family nest: pre-marital investments, marriage markets and spousal allocations

Arbeitspapier

We develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by pre-marital investments, the marriage market is characterized by assortative matching, and endogenously-determined sharing rules form the basis of intra-household allocations. By incorporating pre-marital investments and spousal matching into the collective household model, we are able to identify the fundamental determinants of endogenously determined and maritally sustainable intra-marital sharing rules. In particular, we find that all sharing rules along the assortative order support unconditionally efficient outcomes where both pre-marital investments and intra-household allocations are efficient. The efficiency of both pre-marital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of pre-marital endowments and the sex ratios in the market.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1752

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
• Thema: collective model ; marriage ; bargaining ; household labor supply ; Familienökonomik ; Ehe ; Matching ; Arbeitsangebot

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Iyigun, Murat ; Walsh, Randall P.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33447
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ