Arbeitspapier
Competition in treasury auctions
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance: We find that increased competition reduced bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 127
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
treasury auctions
multi-unit auctions
independent private values
competition
bidder surplus
auction format
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Elsinger, Helmut
Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
Zulehner, Christine
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2016
- DOI
-
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2738381
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-395804
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Elsinger, Helmut
- Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
- Zulehner, Christine
- Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
Entstanden
- 2016