Arbeitspapier

Competition in treasury auctions

We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance: We find that increased competition reduced bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 127

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
treasury auctions
multi-unit auctions
independent private values
competition
bidder surplus
auction format

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Elsinger, Helmut
Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
Zulehner, Christine
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2738381
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-395804
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Elsinger, Helmut
  • Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
  • Zulehner, Christine
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe

Entstanden

  • 2016

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