Arbeitspapier

EU Accession: A Boon or Bane for Corruption?

The formation and expansion of the European Union (EU) have attracted much attention. However, the impact on the level of corruption in a nation after joining the Union has not been formally studied. Any nation that joins the European Union potentially faces two different and opposite effects on corruption. On the one hand, there are reasons to believe that corruption is going to decrease because of the efforts of the EU to fight corruption or because of the opening of the markets to trade; on the other hand, there are reasons to imagine that corruption may increase due to the increase in bureaucracy and new regulations. Hence, the overall effect is not entirely clear from this perspective. This work focuses on the last three rounds of EU entry and empirically studies the effects of joining the EU on corruption. Placing the analysis in the broader literature on the determinants of corruption, the results suggest that entry into the EU increases corruption. However, equally insightful is that this corruption increase does not hold for nations that are potential entrants or that are in the negotiation stage.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8207

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General
Economic Impacts of Globalization: Policy
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
corruption
regulations
free trade European Union
joining the EU
EU negotiations
government

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Alfano, Vincenzo
Capasso, Salvatore
Goel, Rajeev K.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Alfano, Vincenzo
  • Capasso, Salvatore
  • Goel, Rajeev K.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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