Arbeitspapier
Does Group-Based Incentive Pay Lead To Higher Productivity? Evidence from a Complex and Interdependent Industrial Production Process
Group-based incentive pay is attractive in contexts where production is complex and interdependent, yet freeriding is a paramount concern. We assess the introduction of group-based performance pay in a modern industrial production setting using difference-in-difference estimation. Performance increased by 19 percent, with three quarters coming from increased performance of existing workers and the remaining from selection; workers became more efficient and were absent less often. We find little evidence of freeriding; quantile regressions show increased performance throughout the distribution of workers. Features of the design and implementation process created trust, a common goal, and a shared identity, which limited freeriding.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14986
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Organization of Production
- Subject
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difference-in-differences
performance pay
group-based incentive
freeriding
incentive effects
selection effects
absenteeism
efficiency
performance
productivity
trust
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Frederiksen, Anders
Hansen, Daniel Baltzer Schjødt
Flaherty Manchester, Colleen
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2022
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Frederiksen, Anders
- Hansen, Daniel Baltzer Schjødt
- Flaherty Manchester, Colleen
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2022