Artikel

Discretion and accountability: An economic analysis of the ESMA judgment and the Meroni doctrine

This paper assesses the effectiveness of the Meroni doctrine in the light of the recent judgment in the ESMA case. The first part explains in detail the problem of delegation of powers in the EU from the perspective of the principal-agent theory and complements it with the analysis of the trade-off between different levels of independence and accountability of agencies. A simple economic model is developed to illustrate the relationship between the independence and accountability of an agency. It shows that it is the accountability mechanism that induces the agent to act, rather than the extent of his independence. The paper also explains the intertemporal interactions between the principal and the agent on the basis of the incentives in place for the different players.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Intereconomics ; ISSN: 1613-964X ; Volume: 49 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 5 ; Pages: 279-287 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Gewaltenteilung
EU-Recht
Rechtsdurchsetzung
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
EU-Staaten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nicolaides, Phedon
Preziosi, Nadir
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Springer
(wo)
Heidelberg
(wann)
2014

DOI
doi:10.1007/s10272-014-0510-2
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Nicolaides, Phedon
  • Preziosi, Nadir
  • Springer

Entstanden

  • 2014

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