Artikel
A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns
A person's life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of education. In Spence's job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market problem. In contrast, in the integrated model, education as a sorting device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work incentives generated by career concerns.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: KDI Journal of Economic Policy ; ISSN: 2586-4130 ; Volume: 38 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 87-101 ; Sejong: Korea Development Institute (KDI)
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Economics of Contract: Theory
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
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education
signaling
career concerns
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Hwang, Sun Joo
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Korea Development Institute (KDI)
- (wo)
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Sejong
- (wann)
-
2016
- DOI
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doi:10.23895/kdijep.2016.38.2.87
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Hwang, Sun Joo
- Korea Development Institute (KDI)
Entstanden
- 2016
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