Arbeitspapier

High-tech clusters, technology spillovers, and trade secret laws

We analyze firms’ incentives to cluster in an industrial district to benefit from reciprocal technology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is presented where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is shown that firms’ incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following three conditions are met: 1) technological progress is rapid; 2) competition in the product market is relatively soft; 3) the probability of a single firm to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. We show that some trade secret protection is always beneficial for firms’ profits and stimulates clustering. Excessive protection may impede technology spillovers and reduce firms’ incentives to cluster.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working paper ; No. 7-2002

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Regulation and Business Law: General
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
Thema
Cumulative innovation
industrial districts
intellectual property rights
technology spillovers

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fosfuri, Andrea
Rønde, Thomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
(wo)
Frederiksberg
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fosfuri, Andrea
  • Rønde, Thomas
  • Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2002

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