Arbeitspapier

Signaling or marketing? The role of discount control mechanisms in closed-end funds

We study the relevance of signaling and marketing as explanations for the discount control mechanisms that a closed-end fund may choose to adopt in its prospectus. These policies are designed to narrow the potential gap between share price and net asset value, measured by the fund's discount. The two most common discount control mechanisms are explicit discretion to repurchase shares based on the magnitude of the fund discount and mandatory continuation votes that provide shareholders the opportunity to liquidate the fund. We find very limited evidence that a discount control mechanism serves as costly signal of information. Funds with mandatory voting are not more likely to delist than the rest of the CEFs in general or whenever the fund discount is large. Similarly, funds that explicitly discuss share repurchases as a potential response do not subsequently buy back shares more often when discounts do increase. Instead, the existence of these policies is more consistent with marketing explanations because the policies are associated with an increased probability of issuing more equity in subsequent periods.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFS Working Paper Series ; No. 597

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
Thema
closed-end funds
discount
signaling
repurchases
continuation vote

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kräussl, Roman
Pollet, Joshua
Stefanova, Denitsa
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2018

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-469840
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kräussl, Roman
  • Pollet, Joshua
  • Stefanova, Denitsa
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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