Closed-end funds and discount control mechanisms

Arbeitspapier

The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value, We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms such as mandatory continuation votes serve as costly signals of information to reveal higher fund quality to investors, Rents of the skill signaled through the announcement of such policies accrue to managers rather than investors as differences in skill are revealed through growing assets under management rather than risk-adjusted performance.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CFS Working Paper Series ; No. 707

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) ; Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
• Thema: Closed-end funds ; discount ; performance ; skill ; signaling ; information asymmetry ; repurchases ; continuation vote ; Closed-end funds

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kräussl, Roman ; Pollet, Joshua M. ; Stefanova, Denitsa
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2023

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.2139/ssrn.4345001
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/270846
• URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-691288
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ