Arbeitspapier

Political stability and fiscal policy : time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849

This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy choices in a time-series analysis over 158 years on the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal-commons problem of public finances is affected by the time-horizon of a finance minister. Arguably, the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger the longer the time-horizon of a respective term. In addition, a finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office normally enjoys a politically powerful position towards the parliament, the administration and the interest groups to influence policy decisions. In contrast, frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2691

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
National Budget; Budget Systems
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Thema
political stability
fiscal policy
constitutional changes
Finanzpolitik
Nachhaltigkeit
Politische Stabilität
Verfassungsreform
Finanzgeschichte
Schweiz

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Feld, Lars P.
Schaltegger, Christoph A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Feld, Lars P.
  • Schaltegger, Christoph A.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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