Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release

Arbeitspapier

Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information release. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for auctions with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by information release, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5501

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: auctions ; information release ; information partitions ; order statistics ; stochastic orders ; dispersion ; dispersive order ; excess wealth order

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schweizer, Nikolaus ; Szech, Nora
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123145
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET