Konferenzbeitrag

Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release

Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in a market are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information in these markets affects welfare and revenues is of fundamental interest. We introduce new mathematical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for understanding the impact of information. With these tools, we study the comparative statics of welfare versus revenues for markets with one or more objects and varying numbers of bidders. Depending on which parts of a distribution of valuations are most affected by release of information, welfare may react more strongly than revenues, or vice versa.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Auctions ; No. F12-V2

Classification
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Market Design

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Szech, Nora
Schweizer, Nikolaus
Event
Veröffentlichung
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Szech, Nora
  • Schweizer, Nikolaus

Time of origin

  • 2015

Other Objects (12)