Arbeitspapier

The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life

This paper applies the indirect evolutionary approach to study the evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life. The game comprises a dilemma, a problem of coordination, and a problem of distribution as a general framework for the evolution of preferences. In singlegame environments, there emerges a global advantage for inequality-averse individuals in the dilemma and a global disadvantage for inequality-averse players who are favoured by the problem of distribution. The simplified game of life puts these strong predictions into perspective. In particular, selfish and inequality-averse individuals may coexist in the subpopulation, favoured in the problem of distribution.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 219

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Subject
inequality aversion
evolution
preferences

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Müller, Stephan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
(where)
Göttingen
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Müller, Stephan
  • University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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