Arbeitspapier
Competition and Commercial Media Bias
This paper reviews the empirical evidence on commercial media bias (i.e., advertisers influence over media accuracy) and then introduces a simple model to summarize the main elements of the theoretical literature. The analysis provides three main policy insights for media regulators: i) Media regulators should target their monitoring efforts towards news contents upon which advertisers are likely to share similar preferences; ii) In advertising industries characterized by high correlation in products' qualities, an increase in the degree of competition may translate into a lower accuracy of news reports; iii) A sufficiently high degree of competition in the market for news drives out commercial media bias.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 767
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Entertainment; Media
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Blasco, Andrea
Sobbrio, Francesco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4474
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Blasco, Andrea
- Sobbrio, Francesco
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2011