Arbeitspapier

Competition and Commercial Media Bias

This paper reviews the empirical evidence on commercial media bias (i.e., advertisers influence over media accuracy) and then introduces a simple model to summarize the main elements of the theoretical literature. The analysis provides three main policy insights for media regulators: i) Media regulators should target their monitoring efforts towards news contents upon which advertisers are likely to share similar preferences; ii) In advertising industries characterized by high correlation in products' qualities, an increase in the degree of competition may translate into a lower accuracy of news reports; iii) A sufficiently high degree of competition in the market for news drives out commercial media bias.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 767

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Entertainment; Media
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Blasco, Andrea
Sobbrio, Francesco
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2011

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4474
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Blasco, Andrea
  • Sobbrio, Francesco
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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