Strategic interaction between institutional investors and supervision department: a theoretical analysis of low-price collusion in SBIC

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
ISSN
2199-4730
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch
Notes
online resource.

Bibliographic citation
Strategic interaction between institutional investors and supervision department: a theoretical analysis of low-price collusion in SBIC ; volume:9 ; number:1 ; day:28 ; month:1 ; year:2023 ; pages:1-36 ; date:12.2023
Financial innovation ; 9, Heft 1 (28.1.2023), 1-36, 12.2023

Classification
Wirtschaft

Creator
Li, Xin
Chen, Zhuming
Contributor
SpringerLink (Online service)

DOI
10.1186/s40854-022-00413-x
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023040421395671237955
Rights
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
14.08.2025, 11:00 AM CEST

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Associated

  • Li, Xin
  • Chen, Zhuming
  • SpringerLink (Online service)

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