Aggregation in Matching Markets

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops aggregate relations for a matching market of heterogeneous suppliers and demanders. The point of departure is the analysis of two-sided matching found in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). Under particular assumptions about the distribution of preferences, the present paper derives asymptotic aggregate relations for the number of realized matches of different types in the presence of flexible contracts (such as a price). Simulation experiments demonstrate that the model also provides excellent predictions in small populations.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 173

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Labor Contracts
• Subject: two-sided matching models ; discrete choice ; market equilibrium ; marriage models ; the Golden Section.

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dagsvik, John K.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Statistics Norway, Research Department
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 1996

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/192157
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET