Arbeitspapier
Non-standard choice in matching markets
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior that is consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 22-054
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Design
- Thema
-
Matching Theory
Market Design
Stability
College Admissions Market
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Caspari, Gian
Khanna, Manshu
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Caspari, Gian
- Khanna, Manshu
- ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Entstanden
- 2022
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