Arbeitspapier
Overtime Working and Contract Efficiency
We present a wage-hours contract designed to minimize costly job turnover given investments in on the job training combined with firm and worker information asymmetries. It may be optimal for the parties to work 'long hours' remunerated at premium rates for guaranteed overtime hours. Based on British plant and machine operatives, we test three predictions. First, trained workers with longer job tenure are more likely to work overtime. Second, hourly overtime pay exceeds the value of marginal product while the basic hourly wage is less than the value of marginal product. Third, the basic hourly wage is negatively related to the overtime premium.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7560
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Contracts
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Subject
-
paid overtime
wage-hours contract
plant and machine operatives
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hart, Robert A.
Ma, Yue
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2013
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hart, Robert A.
- Ma, Yue
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2013
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