Wages, Hours and Human Capital over the Life Cycle

Arbeitspapier

We investigate wage-hours contracts within a four-period rent sharing model that incorporates asymmetric information. Distinctions are made among (a) an investment period, (b) a period in which the parties may separate (quits or layoffs) or continue rent accumulation and sharing, (c) a post investment period and, (d) retirement. We establish that increases in both wage rates and hours of work in the post-investment period serve to minimise sub-optimal separations and, moreover that both wage and hours schedules are concave. The model is tested with the British Household Panel Survey (1991-1997) and with the British Labour Force Survey (1993/4).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 139

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Labor Contracts
• Thema: Lifetime wage-hours contracts ; asymmetric information ; estimated wage- and hourtenure profiles ; Arbeitsvertrag ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Arbeitszeit ; Bildungsinvestition ; Lebenszyklus ; Schätzung ; Theorie ; Großbritannien

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hart, Robert A. ; Ma, Yue
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2000

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20979
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ