Wages, Hours and Human Capital over the Life Cycle

Arbeitspapier

We investigate wage-hours contracts within a four-period rent sharing model that incorporates asymmetric information. Distinctions are made among (a) an investment period, (b) a period in which the parties may separate (quits or layoffs) or continue rent accumulation and sharing, (c) a post investment period and, (d) retirement. We establish that increases in both wage rates and hours of work in the post-investment period serve to minimise sub-optimal separations and, moreover that both wage and hours schedules are concave. The model is tested with the British Household Panel Survey (1991-1997) and with the British Labour Force Survey (1993/4).

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 139

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Labor Contracts
• Subject: Lifetime wage-hours contracts ; asymmetric information ; estimated wage- and hourtenure profiles ; Arbeitsvertrag ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Arbeitszeit ; Bildungsinvestition ; Lebenszyklus ; Schätzung ; Theorie ; Großbritannien

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hart, Robert A. ; Ma, Yue
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20979
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET