Arbeitspapier

The Prediction Value

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of v(S) when i cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every n-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues – including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value – can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-188/II

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
influence
voting games
cooperative games
Banzhaf value
Shapley value

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Koster, Maurice
Kurz, Sascha
Lindner, Ines
Napel, Stefan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Koster, Maurice
  • Kurz, Sascha
  • Lindner, Ines
  • Napel, Stefan
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2013

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