Arbeitspapier
The Prediction Value
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player is prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of v(S) when i cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every n-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-188/II
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
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influence
voting games
cooperative games
Banzhaf value
Shapley value
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Koster, Maurice
Kurz, Sascha
Lindner, Ines
Napel, Stefan
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Koster, Maurice
- Kurz, Sascha
- Lindner, Ines
- Napel, Stefan
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2013