The Prediction Value

Arbeitspapier

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of v(S) when i cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every n-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues – including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value – can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-188/II

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: influence ; voting games ; cooperative games ; Banzhaf value ; Shapley value

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Koster, Maurice ; Kurz, Sascha ; Lindner, Ines ; Napel, Stefan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89242
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET