Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: Experts vs. quacks

Arbeitspapier

The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a sufficiently general class earlier reports are more credible. Further, any report hurts the forecaster's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 334

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Expectations; Speculations
• Subject: career concerns ; reputation ; dynamic games ; games of timing ; strategic information transmission

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Smirnov, Aleksei ; Starkov, Egor
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Zurich, Department of Economics
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2019

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5167/uzh-176854
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/206850
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET