Arbeitspapier
Forecasts as Repeated Cheap Talk from an Expert of Unknown Statistical Bias
For two periods an expert E announces his forecast of the state to a decision-maker D who chooses action. They disagree about the precision of the probability assessments. At the end of period 1 the state is observed. In the last period E makes announcements more extreme than his forecasts. Despite countable equilibria, full revelation is never realised. When in period 1 E is interested in reputation only, the initial equilibrium partition is finite; E makes announcements of greater uncertainty with respect to his forecasts. When E is interested in action too, reputational concerns mitigate exaggerated reports.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 020.2023
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Expectations; Speculations
- Thema
-
cheap-talk
expert
statistical bias
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Valsecchi, Irene
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Valsecchi, Irene
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2023
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